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Constructing State Power: Internal and External Frontiers in 
Colonial North India, 1850s-1900s  
1. INTRODUCTION 
British colonial authority in Sindh, a small province in the northwest of the Indian 
subcontinent, confronted two important types of frontier between the 1850s and the turn of the 
twentieth century.  Frontiers, in this context, are zones where state power is severely limited. I 
characterise the two types in Sindh as external and internal. External frontiers I take to be 
political boundaries, separating territory under one state’s control from what lies beyond. This 
could be another organised state or non-centralised forms of social organisation – either way, the 
key characteristic of the frontier is that it denotes the limit of the state’s claimed authority. The 
external frontier that I examine in this article was land near Sindh’s northern border, which was 
also part of the north-western boundary of British India. Beyond it lay Balochistan, a 
mountainous region inhabited by Baloch tribes.1 By internal frontiers I mean ecological-
economic boundaries, beyond which a state’s ability to manage people and landscapes is 
severely limited. Internal frontiers in nineteenth century Sindh were places where difficult 
terrain, poor communications, and a scarce population meant the state had a minimal presence, 
and little direct control.2  
                                                     
1 This article follows the modern spellings of place names such as ‘Sindh’ and ‘Balochistan’, except in citations and 
direct quotations. 
2 This article’s categories, external and internal frontiers, bear some similarities to Prescott’s primary and 
secondary settlement frontiers, but departs from his assumption that settlement frontiers are necessarily 
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This article compares colonial policy on the external and internal frontiers, identifying 
changes and continuities in how officials used irrigation technology and population resettlement 
to enhance state authority there. I explain why the internal frontier eventually overtook the 
external frontier in colonial priorities. On each frontier the colonial authorities used similar 
methods to extend their control into previously ‘unstable’ areas. In particular, they dug irrigation 
canals and parcelled out agricultural land. But the specific drivers of the two frontier policies, the 
differing scope of environmental and demographic change, and the much greater level of control 
that officials envisaged on the internal frontier, meant that there were significant differences 
between the each type of frontier. The changing official discourses concerning frontiers in 
nineteenth century Sindh help us to identify developing ideas about populations, nature, and the 
morality of colonial rule. 
The British Indian Empire’s north-western frontier, particularly the Pashtun regions of 
what is now north-western Pakistan, is best known to scholarship for the complexity of relations 
between the British and the tribes who lived there.3 An emerging scholarship on the region, 
though dynamic, has not so far addressed the relationship between frontier imperialism and 
natural environments. My study of frontiers in Sindh goes some way towards highlighting the 
importance of environmental change in understanding the region.4 Today Sindh is the 
southernmost province of Pakistan, where the River Indus meets the sea (see Fig 1). Conquered 
                                                     
colonized by self-motivated people. This article portrays a heavy official hand in frontier settlement. See JRV 
Prescott, Political Frontiers and Boundaries (London: Unwin Hyman, 1987), ch. 2. 
3 Sana Haroon, Frontier of Faith: A history of religious mobilisation in the Pakhtun Tribal Areas, 1890-1950 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2011). Christian Tripodi, Edge of Empire: The British Political Officer and Tribal 
Administration on the North-West Frontier, 1877-1947 (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011). Magnus Marsden and Benjamin 
D Hopkins, Fragments of the Afghan Frontier (London: Hurst, 2011). Martin J Bayly, ‘The ‘Re-Turn’ To Empire in IR: 
Colonial Knowledge Communities and the Construction of the Idea of the Afghan Polity, 1809-38’, Review of 
International Studies 40, no. 3 (2014): 443-464.  
4 On the interaction between political, environmental and religious frontiers on the opposite side of the 
subcontinent, see Richard M Eaton, The Rise of Islam and the Bengal Frontier, 1204-1706 (Berkeley; Los Angeles; 
London: University of California Press, 1993), ch. 8-9. 
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by the British in 1843, it lay at the southern end of a belt of border provinces which also came to 
include Punjab (from 1849) and the North-West Frontier Province (from 1901). Sindh abutted 
the tribal lands of Balochistan and lay along the route from the sea to Afghanistan. Yet, as this 
article shows, officials in Sindh were far more concerned with the local implications of Sindh’s 
frontier status: the possibility of tribal incursions in northern Sindh, on one hand, and on the 
other, the highly uneven distribution of state authority in south-eastern Sindh. One of the most 
important ways that the British addressed problems of frontier governance was by organizing the 
digging of canals from the Indus and settling the land that these irrigated. Canal policy afforded 
officials a chance to shape the relationship between people and state, using transformations of 
the social and agricultural landscapes to assert greater control. In colonial narratives, the 
expansion of irrigation in Sindh pacified an unruly population while domesticating a severe 
landscape. 
The external and internal frontiers that this article discusses lay respectively on the border 
with tribal Balochistan and in south-eastern Sindh. The external frontier, Upper Sindh, was at the 
edge of British territory. There, the porousness of the border between the Upper Sindh Frontier 
District and Balochistan led officials to see canal construction as a way to transform the frontier 
into ‘state space’ (following Scott’s terminology).5 Over the next fifty years, this external 
frontier gave way to the internal frontier in colonial priorities. The internal frontier featured in 
this article was located on the edge of the Thar Desert, comfortably within the territorial 
boundaries of British sovereignty but subject to significantly poorer state control than 
surrounding districts. Following the increasing regularisation of canal construction and 
colonization policy in the province overall, the administration constructed the Jamrao Canal in 
                                                     
5 James C Scott, The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia (New Haven; 
London: Yale University Press, 2009), 40. 
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this region during the 1890s and 1900s. Officials also drew up detailed plans for land use, 
demarcating field patterns, defining new village limits and closely controlling water distribution.  
Comparing the two frontiers illustrates the process through which the colonial state 
territorialised its rule. It came increasingly to employ techniques of political control, through 
environmental transformation, that were framed in spatial terms. That framing changed over 
time. Early external frontier policy aimed to establish a colonial space in which settled 
agriculture could transform ‘wild’ Baloch tribesmen into peaceable cultivators. This established 
a distinctive social and moral landscape that contrasted with non-British domains across the 
border. It meant making good on the colonial government’s claim to sovereignty over Sindh’s 
territory. Later on, internal frontier policy also pushed state authority into regions where it had 
been weak before. The intention this time was not to define the character of empire’s territorial 
‘inside’, but to create a modern landscape combining technically efficient irrigation, profitable 
agriculture, and a politically stable rural society.  Before addressing the case studies, however, 
the next section discusses the value and limitations of frontiers as a category of analysis in the 
case of Sindh. 
2. FRONTIERS IN THEORY  
 
The concept of internal and external frontiers in South Asian history is not new, but the 
majority of existing literature applies to the early modern periods, or the earlier days of East 
India Company rule. Scholarship on the Mughal Empire (1526-c.1818), Britain’s imperial 
predecessor in the subcontinent, has demonstrated that state control in South Asia had long 
historical geographies of limitation. Heesterman has argued that the power of the Mughal state 
depended on control of urban centres, which financed and processed agricultural outputs from 
surrounding hinterlands. Mughal oversight concentrated on such towns, and the trade routes 
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connecting them. Imperial officials and tributary local rulers (often indistinguishable in practice) 
extracted agricultural surpluses where they could, and some of this made its way to the imperial 
court as revenue. Where imperial officers could not extend their authority, through a lack of 
soldiers or road access, local leaders frequently refused to pay tribute. Such spaces, rather than 
the outer borders around the Mughals’ proclaimed domains, constituted what Heesterman called 
‘The real frontier […] a ragged and shifting internal one’.6 The distinction between imperial 
control and its absence characterises the internal frontier in Heesterman’s analysis, something 
that this article broadly supports.  
Gommans interprets medieval and early modern South Asian ‘inner frontiers’ more 
decisively as ecological phenomena. In his analysis, inner frontier were the interface between 
settled agrarian societies in humid or artificially irrigated tracts and pastoral nomads in drier 
zones. Such interfaces, he argues, provided the ideal location for state capitals between 1200 and 
1800 because regimes increasingly drew on both the agricultural produce of settled peasants and 
the horses, camels and dromedaries that pastoralists bred, as well as the mercenary services of 
pastoralists themselves.7 This article demonstrates that the later British colonial state, too, 
articulated and made use of distinctions between settled and pastoral zones. Rather than preserve 
Gommans’s inner frontier as a strategic resource, however, I argue that frontier policy during the 
second half of the nineteenth century was geared towards replacing mobile populations with 
settled agriculturalists, wherever the government perceived a pressing need to do so.  
In colonial Sindh the twinned processes of transforming environments and extending 
                                                     
6 JC Heesterman, ‘Western Expansion, Indian Reaction: Mughal Empire and British Raj’, in The Inner Conflict of 
Tradition: Essays in Indian ritual, kingship, and society (Chicago; London: University of Chicago Press, 1985), esp. 
170. 
7 Jos Gommans, ‘The Silent Frontier of South Asia, c. AD 1100-1800’, Journal of World History 9, no. 1 (Spring 
1998), 1-23. See also Jos Gommans, ‘Warhorse and post-nomadic empire in Asia, c.1000-1800’, Journal of Global 
History 2, no. 1 (March 2007), 1-21. 
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state power were top-down, official-driven plans to change land-use patterns, redistribute 
populations, and introduce market economics. My case studies differ from classic examples of 
frontier settlement in which states relied on a mass of settlers to take the initiative in pushing into 
‘new’ lands beyond what the state claimed as its own, and turn them into tax revenue-producing 
farmlands.8 As I will argue, both external and internal frontier policy in Sindh had both 
ecological-economic and political aspects, aiming to produce social and agricultural landscapes 
that emplaced colonial order. The two case studies were differentiated by the type and scope of 
colonial order that officials worked towards, something that was heavily influenced by Upper 
Sindh’s location at the edge of British territory, and south-eastern Sindh’s position well within it. 
The spatial orientation of the two frontiers, external and internal, is the key to understanding this 
difference, and therefore the colonial administration’s changing relationship to people and space.  
Space, and contrasting moral valuations of it, can indeed be at the heart of frontier 
thinking. As an imperial power, the colonial government in British India was not bound by 
considerations of ethnic, linguistic or religious (still less ‘national’) limits to its authority. British 
power came to rest, geographically speaking, at a line beyond which the colonial authorities 
could not or would not push. Because Sindh lay at the edge of British India, the western part of 
its provincial boundary was also the imperial boundary. The tribes of Balochistan lay beyond. In 
principle, the colonial government claimed sovereignty over the whole of Sindh. Having 
sovereignty in one place but not in another, contiguous place is important. As Walker has argued, 
                                                     
8 Populations in North America thrust westwards during the 18th and 19th centuries. Russian peasants expanded 
into the Tatar lands of the semi-forested steppe south-east of Moscow between the 16th and 18th centuries, with a 
defensive military line gradually following behind them. On the US, see John C Hudson, ‘North American Origins of 
Middlewestern Frontier Populations’, Annals of the Association of American Geographers 78, no. 3 (September 
1988), 395-413. On Russia, see John F Richards, The Unending Frontier: An environmental history of the early 
modern world (Berkeley; London: University of California Press, 2003), 255-267. 
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distinguishing a state’s territorial ‘outside’ is essential to creating a political order within its 
‘inside’.9 Yet in practice, as this article will show, Sindh’s boundaries did not represent a hard 
spatial edge to British power. Instead, the regions abutting the border were zones of lesser state 
control. I follow political geography literature in terming such zones frontiers, in contrast with 
borders or boundaries which evoke a precise division of territory between two states.10 I also 
follow environmental historians who have used the concept of frontiers to mean places where 
colonizing states and societies come up against hostile, unfamiliar terrain, often already occupied 
by indigenous people.11 Porousness (that is, openness to tribesmen’s unauthorized mobility) 
characterised Sindh’s external frontier, as did a sparse population, dearth of cultivated land, and 
intense heat. As this article demonstrates, colonial frontier policy there aimed to reduce mobility 
while increasing agricultural production. These aims were, however, modest. This is not a story 
of turning a ‘soft’ frontier into a ‘hard’ border, but of creating a more settled space within British 
Sindh that contrasted with the ‘wildness’ (as the British perceived it) of Balochistan. In other 
words, I will demonstrate how the British intended to change the character of the Upper Sindh 
Frontier as a zone. They focussed on addressing on the social and natural environment within 
nominal colonial territory, rather than asserting state power at the border itself. 
My understanding of the colonial state’s endeavours to produce particular geographies of 
                                                     
9 RBJ Walker, Inside/Outside: International relations as political theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1993). 
10 Prescott, Political Frontiers and Boundaries, 36. Peter Sahlins, Boundaries: The making of France and Spain in the 
Pyrenees (Berkeley; Oxford: University of California Press, 1989), 4-5 
11 Richards, The Unending Frontier. William Beinart and Lotte Hughes, Environment and Empire (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007). Michael A. Redclift, Frontiers: Histories of civil society and nature (Cambridge, Mass.; 
London: MIT Press, 2006). David A. Bello, ‘To Go Where No Han Could Go For Long: Malaria and the Qing 
construction of ethnic administrative space in frontier Yunnan’, Modern China 31, no. 3 (2005): 283-317. Gregg 
Mitman, ‘In Search of Health: Landscape and disease in American environmental history’, Environmental History 10 
(April 2005): 184-210. 
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power draws on Scott’s recent analysis of the relationship in Southeast Asia between socially 
stratified agrarian states based in valleys and egalitarian, tribally-organised people living in 
mountainous regions nearby. He terms the latter ‘state-evaders’. Scott helpfully distinguishes 
between the valleys as ‘state space’ and the mountains as ‘non-state space’.12 He argues that 
valley states projected a moral divide between state space as ‘civilised’ and non-state space as its 
‘uncivilised’ other. Scott’s examples present striking similarities to British India, where colonial 
control was strong on the central plains but tenuous in the mountains to the north-west and north-
east.13 Gilmartin shows that British colonial rule’s claim to legitimacy in the Indus Basin also 
rested on drawing a moral divide between settled agriculture on the plains and nomadism in the 
hills.14  
Scott also presents the flipside of this civilizational worldview, arguing that for hill 
people themselves, evading state structures was a positive reason to live at altitude. He points to 
the flexible and shifting names, group identifications, and origin stories of hill people as 
designed to resist being understood by outsiders. The complexity of Baloch tribal organisation in 
the lands beyond Sindh, with multiple branches, shifting claims to lineage, and openness to 
groups moving in and out of particular tribes, suggests that the hill Baloch might have taken a 
similar approach.15 Understanding how Baloch conceptualised their relationship to Sindh, to 
                                                     
12 Scott, The Art of Not Being Governed, 99-125. 
13 On the northeast, see Markus Franke, War and Nationalism in South Asia: The Indian state and the Nagas 
(Abingdon; New York: Routledge, 2009). Scott notes that other types of difficult terrain, such as swamps and 
forests, can also prevent the effective extension of state space. For an analysis of indigenous resistance to colonial 
forest policy in India, see Madhav Gadgil and Ramachandra Guha, This Fissured Land: An ecological history of India 
(Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1992), ch. 5.  
14 David Gilmartin, Blood and Water: Environment, community and empire in the Indus Basin (University of 
California Press, forthcoming 2015), ch. 2 [p.39 of manuscript]. 
15 On Baloch social structure in the nineteenth century, see M Longworth Dames, The Baloch Race: A historical and 
ethnological sketch (London: Royal Asiatic Society, 1904). Denys Bray (ed.), Ethnographic Survey of Balochistan 
(Bombay: Times Press, 1913). 
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settled agriculture, and to the colonial state would certainly enrich our understanding of the 
external frontier. But histories of Balochistan, and sources putting forward tribal points of view, 
are scarce.16 This article therefore tells only the imperialists’ side of the story.  
The existence of frontiers as zones of reduced state control helps to advance on Scott’s 
more straightforward conceptualisation of a binary distinction between ‘state’ and ‘non-state’ 
space. This was true of the external frontier, as an interstice between British and Baloch territory 
that displayed characteristics of both. It was also true of Sindh’s internal frontiers, where the 
challenges to colonial authority were environmental and economic rather than political. This is 
not wholly surprising: historiography of frontiers in other imperial contexts has convincingly 
shown human impact on the environment, and vice versa, to be a key part of frontier conquest.17 
In South Asia, several scholars have shown that transformations of nature and landscapes in 
colonial north India were fundamental to the extension of state power during the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries. Canal irrigation is particularly pertinent in the case of India’s semi-
arid north and northwest.18 What differentiates my study from more classical environmental 
                                                     
16 For comparable difficulties relating to the Pashtun areas of modern north-western Pakistan, see Elisabeth Leake, 
'The Politics of the North-West Frontier of the Indian Subcontinent, 1936-65' (Unpublished PhD thesis: University 
of Cambridge, 2013), 21-22. 
17 The foundational text of American frontier studies was Frederick Jackson Turner, ‘The Significance of the 
Frontier in American History’ (1893), in ‘The Significance of the Frontier in American History’ and Other Essays/ 
With Commentary by John Mack Faragher (New York: H. Holt, 1994). Turner’s venerable thesis remains important 
in American environmental history today: see TRC Hutton, ‘Beating a Dead Horse?: The continuing presence of 
Frederick Jackson Turner in environmental and Western history’, International Social Science Review 77, no. 1/2 
(2002): 47-57. For other examples, see Richards, The Unending Frontier, 4-6, 112-147, 242-273, 334-376. Alan 
Lester, ‘Settlers, the State and Colonial Power: The colonization of Queen Adelaide Province, 1834-37’, The Journal 
of African History 39:2 (1998). Caroline A Williams, Between Resistance and Adaptation: Indigenous peoples and 
the colonisation of the Chocó, 1510-1753 (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2004). William Cronon, George 
Miles, and Jay Gitlin (ed.s), Under an Open Sky: Rethinking America's Western past (New York; London: W.W. 
Norton, 1992). Daviken Studnicki-Gizbert and David Schecter, ‘The Environmental Dynamics of a Colonial Fuel-
Rush: Silver mining and deforestation in New Spain, 1522 to 1810’, Environmental History 15 (January 2010): 94–
119. 
18 Gadgil and Guha, This Fissured Land, 113-140. David Arnold, The Tropics and the Traveling Gaze: India, 
landscape, and science, 1800-1856 (Delhi: Permanent Black, 2005). David Gilmartin, ‘Scientific Empire and Imperial 
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histories is an explicit engagement with space, as well as people and natural environments, as an 
object of transformation. My discussion of British canal-colony development in south-eastern 
Sindh demonstrates an official concern with creating what Walker terms the ‘flat territorialities 
of states’ in which all the space within a state’s boundaries is equally subject to state authority.19 
Again, British officials did not necessarily expect to create a genuinely ‘flat’ state space. Indeed, 
as I will argue, colonial planners used the conceptual (if not actual demographic) emptiness of 
the internal frontier to create a zone of greater-than-average state power, where a more precisely-
managed water delivery system combined with a more strictly-managed agricultural settlement 
policy. The internal and external frontiers both therefore represented zones of differentiation, 
conceptually and practically different from the bulk of the province. Frontiers, in other words, 
demonstrate that not all state spaces are created, or remain, equal. 
 
3. BALOCH TRIBES AND SINDH’S EXTERNAL FRONTIER 
Canal-building during the 1860s represented a self-conscious British attempt to transform 
the unstable region of northern Sindh and consolidate colonial control on the external frontier. 
Sindh’s north-west was subject to frequent raids by tribesmen crossing the border from 
Balochistan. British officials responded by turning the area into a site for the joint remaking of 
Sindh’s landscape and Baloch tribal society.  This section specifically reflects on correspondence 
between two British officers about how to deal with a troublesome group of border tribesmen 
known as the Masuris. The officers’ solution was not punitive violence, but to encourage the 
Masuris to dig canals and settle in Sindh. This demonstrated the flexibility of the imperial system 
in India, which used irrigated agriculture to incorporate, or at least pacify, ‘unruly natives’. 
                                                     
Science: Colonialism and irrigation technology in the Indus Basin’, The Journal of Asian Studies 53, no. 4 (1994): 
1127-1149. 
19 Walker, Inside/outside, 131. 
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Officials expected canal-digging, and settling Baloch tribes on the land canals irrigated, to pacify 
the tribes and bring the Sindh-Balochistan borderlands under surer control. Transforming the 
region, known as Upper Sindh, created an ‘inside’ to colonial space. Settled, peaceable 
agriculture characterised this space, which contrasted sharply with the presumed violence and 
unrestrained mobility of the ‘outside’, the Baloch tribal regions. Travelling north-west from the 
Sindh’s administration’s base in Karachi, the external frontier came to represent the last outpost 
of colonial space.  
The transformative potential of canal-based agriculture was by no means unique to the 
frontier. Digging canals, irrigating farmland, and extracting revenue from cultivators were 
standard British practices in north India, and benefitted the colonial government politically and 
economically. In Punjab, especially, colonial engineers’ control of canal water from the 1840s 
onwards helped the British to build alliances with peasants and landlords alike. 20 These 
relationships persisted until the British withdrawal from India in 1947. British engineers’ water 
projects across India amounted to what D’Souza has termed ‘colonial hydrology’, which 
favoured large-scale technological interventions to mark state power and produce profit.21 
Yet canal construction in Upper Sindh was distinctive because its geographical contiguity 
with ‘wild’ Balochistan put it in close proximity to space over which the colonial state neither 
had nor claimed any authority. In the decades after the British general, Sir Charles Napier, 
conquered Sindh’s rulers, the Talpur Mirs, in 1843, the new province’s border with Balochistan 
remained unstable. Stretching 150 miles from Kashmore to the northern spurs of the Hala 
                                                     
20 Imran Ali, The Punjab Under Imperialism, 1885-1947 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988). M Mufakharul 
Islam, Irrigation, Agriculture and the Raj: Punjab, 1887-1947 (New Delhi: Manohar, 1997). Daniel R Headrick, The 
Tentacles of Progress: Technology transfer in the age of imperialism, 1850-1940 (New York; Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1988). 
21 Rohan D’Souza, ‘Water in British India: The making of a ‘colonial hydrology’’, History Compass 4, no. 4 (2006): 
621-628.  
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Mountains, this was a region where the colonial administration relied on military force to prevent 
Baloch tribesmen from crossing into British territory and attacking colonial subjects. The open, 
flat nature of the land helped colonial authorities to deploy force effectively. So did population 
distribution. Villages in the neighbouring British-controlled province of Punjab nestled close to 
the Balochistan border and presented nearby targets to incoming tribesmen, but imperial cavalry 
could patrol more effectively in sparely-populated northern Sindh.22 Targeted violence made the 
reputations of legendary British officials. The most famous example in Sindh was John Jacob, 
who established forts and led punitive cross-border raids across against the tribes. Better-known 
still was Robert Sandeman in southern Punjab.23 Irrigation extension on the Upper Sindh frontier 
was therefore only one aspect of colonial efforts to impose order. Coercion was equally 
important.   
The British, on annexing Sindh, had claimed sovereignty over the plains. The 
surrounding hills to the west and north were the domain of Baloch tribesmen. But this was 
mainly a geographical distinction, and there was no sure way to differentiate ‘Baloch’ from some 
‘Sindhi’ people. Thirteenth-century writers reported the presence of Baloch in north-western 
Sindh, and tribes sporadically raided in Sindh thereafter.24 According to one early twentieth-
century ethnography, the ‘native’ application of the term Balochistan included the Jacobabad and 
Shikarpur districts of Upper Sindh, as well as parts of Punjab and Persia in which ethnic Baloch 
lived. The author estimated that people identifiable as ‘Baloch’ comprised nearly one-quarter of 
                                                     
22 Thomas Henry Thornton, Colonel Sir Robert Sandeman: His life and work on our Indian frontier (London: John 
Murray, 1895), 15-17. 
23 On Jacob, see Hugh Trevor Lambrick, John Jacob of Jacobabad [1960] (Karachi; London: Oxford University Press, 
1975), 113-115, 147-172. On Sandeman, see Christian Tripodi, Edge of Empire: The British Political Officer and 
tribal administration on the North-West Frontier, 1877-1947 (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011); Marsden and Hopkins, 
Fragments of the Afghan Frontier. 
24 Dames, The Baloch Race, 33, 40, 50, 53. 
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Sindh’s population at that time. They retained tribal genealogies but were ‘more or less 
assimilated’ into the Sindhi population, suggesting that a clear territorial division between the 
Sindhi and Baloch areas did not exist.25 The Talpurs themselves had been Baloch immigrants, 
originally retainers of the previous, native Sindhi Kalhora rulers whom they displaced in 1783.  
The relationship between the people and places of Sindh and Balochistan was therefore 
complex and dynamic. British colonial officials could hardly distinguish clearly between Sindhis 
as British subjects and Baloch as foreign. Instead, colonial understanding of the Upper Sindh 
frontier revolved around thinking of people living in British territory as civilisable. Officials 
assumed that ‘wild’ Baloch tribesmen, by digging canals and settling the land canals irrigated, 
could become civilised. They would simultaneously transform themselves and the physical 
environment of their new home. Marsden and Hopkins have shown how this conceptualisation of 
people and places at the edge of imperial territory developed into what they term ‘frontier 
governmentality’ in Balochistan during the 1870s-1890s. Elsewhere, colonial governance in the 
‘settled’ parts of the Indian interior attempted to fix Indians into ethnographic categories which 
objectified social groups and rendered them malleable for policymakers. By contrast, Marsden 
and Hopkins argue, British frontier policy depended on excluding tribesmen from colonial space 
and therefore from the modernizing aspect of imperial rule.26 This offers a context-specific way 
to frame Scott’s idea of state and non-state spaces. The superior civilisation of settled 
agriculturalists was, from a colonial point of view, a beneficial product of being under British 
rule. The moral divide between colonial and tribal space was central to the supposed legitimacy 
of British rule.27 In this context, British actions in Upper Sindh’s borderlands attempted to bring 
                                                     
25 Dames, The Baloch Race, 1. 
26 Marsden and Hopkins, Fragments of the Afghan Frontier, 64-102. 
27 David Gilmartin, Blood and Water, ch. 2 [p.39 of manuscript]. 
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Baloch tribes into an area where irrigation policy could act on them: to remove them from tribal 
space into colonial space, and render them malleable. By this means the colonial authorities 
established Upper Sindh as a state space, in contrast with the presumed characteristics of 
empire’s ‘outside’, mountainous Balochistan.   
British assumptions about the characteristics of plains space and hill space, the inside and 
outside of empire, appeared strikingly in the government’s policy towards the Masuri tribe, a 
branch of the Baloch Bugtis, during the 1860s. The Masuris had long troubled settled 
agriculturalists in British territory with violent attacks. In 1864, the Masuri chief approached the 
Political Agent in Balochistan, Major Malcom Green, to ask for a grant of land in an uncultivated 
tract of Sindh’s Sairwah Canal. Green wrote that the Masuris were ‘amongst the boldest 
plunderers [of cattle and property] along the Frontier’, but were probably driven to their lifestyle 
by poverty. The example of other Baloch tribes in the area, he thought, had shown the Masuris 
the kind of benefits that could accrue from settling down to agriculture under British 
supervision.28 Green recommended that the Sindh government grant the Masuris’ request. This 
followed established local precedent. John Jacob, a pioneering British officer of the region, had 
previously addressed the problem of Baloch incursions into the thinly populated, scrub-covered 
frontier region of Upper Sindh during the late 1840s and early 1850s. Jacob had given unused, 
government-owned land to Baloch tribes, who cleared the scrub and dug canals. Tribesmen, 
Jacob reasoned, were the one group who would not fear attacks from other Baloch pastoralists.29 
                                                     
28 Major Malcolm Green, Political Agent in Beloochistan [sic], to Lieutenant-Colonel HNR Green, Political 
Superintendent and Commandant on the Frontier Upper Sind [sic], 14 January 1864. Maharashtra State Archives 
(MSA), Government of Bombay (GoB) Revenue Department (RD) vol. 26 of 1865, compilation 422. Sources do not 
specify the leader’s name, but the memoir of a Punjab officer refers to dead raiders in Dera Ghazi Khan district of 
southern Punjab in 1866 as ‘Mussoorie Bugtis’ belonging to Gholam Hossein’s band. Gholam Hossein might be the 
leader in question. Richard Isaac Bruce, The Forward Policy and Its Results; or, thirty-five years’ work amongst the 
tribes on our North-West Frontier of India (London: Longmans & Co, 1900), 19. 
29 Lambrick, John Jacob, 239-240. 
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Allocating canal land in Upper Sindh was, by the time of the Masuri tribe’s request, a well-
established method of neutralising threats to colonial authority by bringing Baloch tribesmen into 
the state’s territorial, and therefore administrative and moral, domain. In other words, Jacob had 
begun the production of colonial space on the external frontier.  
Since colonial authorities had plenty of land at their disposal, and the Baloch themselves 
dug canals before settling it, the frontier settlement policy was pragmatic. But officials’ 
understandings of the relationship between Baloch people and the natural environment lent 
ideological reinforcement to the practice. Major Green’s correspondence on the Masuris 
highlighted the power of landscapes to provoke good or bad relations between tribes and the 
colonial state. He presented a deterministic picture in which the Baloch would respond inevitably 
to improved environmental conditions. He suggested to a fellow officer on the Upper Sindh 
frontier that ‘full benefit would be derived by Government, [if] the settlement of the Tribe within 
our borders […] remove[d] an important [source] of restlessness and discord from the hills’.30 
The letter’s recipient was the Political Superintendent and Commandant on the Upper Sindh 
Frontier, Lieutenant-Colonel HNR Green (the shared surname seems to be coincidental). He in 
turn commended the Major’s recommendations to Sindh’s chief administrator, the 
Commissioner-in-Sindh. Lieutenant-Colonel Green of the Upper Sindh frontier used similar 
language to that of his junior officer: ‘I feel confident’, he wrote, that ‘if certain tracts of land 
were reserved near [the canal] for any [Baloch] mountaineers, who wished to settle within 
British Territory[,] that the plundering tribes of whose depredations we occasionally hear so 
much of [sic] would gradually become peaceable cultivators’.31  The Greens’ correspondence 
                                                     
30 Major Malcolm Green to Lieutenant-Colonel HNR Green, 14 January 1864. 
31 Lieutenant-Colonel HNR Green, Political Superintendent and Commandant on the Frontier Upper Sind, to J 
Mansfield, Commissioner-in-Sindh, 25 January 1864. MSA, GoB RD vol. 26 of 1865, compilation 422. 
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contrasted the apparent poverty of pastoralism in the Balochistan hill tracts with the material 
benefits of agrarian life. As the Major Green, the Political Agent in Balochistan, would have it, 
the ‘comparative luxury’ that tribes already under British protection in Sindh enjoyed 
characterised the colonial space of British Sindh. By contrast, an ‘exciting but precarious mode 
of life’ based on plunder characterised the space outside.32  
In fact, the relationship between rugged terrain, tribal society, and cross-border violence 
was more complex. Missing from Major Green’s analysis was the unstable political condition of 
Kalat, the region of Balochistan next to Upper Sindh –surprisingly, since he represented the 
imperial government there. During an ongoing civil war against his subordinate tribal chiefs, the 
Khan of Kalat had dug into his fort and relinquished any hope of disciplining the tribes of the 
northern hills.33 A complex reality is also the implication of one historian’s assertion that a 
common reason for cross-border raiding was blood feuds between tribes inside and outside 
British territory, rather than straightforward robbery.34 Nevertheless, Major Green reduced the 
problem to a simplified sequence in which a poor environment in the tribal area led to poverty, 
which in turn led to raiding in British Sindh. Consequently, in the proposal to settle Masuris on 
the Sairwah Canal tract, the agricultural plains appeared to colonial officials as a space in which 
landscape, irrigation technology, and colonial authority could combine to remake tribal society. 
The case of the Masuris demonstrates one way in which officials attempted to bring ‘uncivilised’ 
tribes into the colonial fold. Sindh’s external frontier became a site for re-making tribal society. 
Yet the Greens’ correspondence pointed to the contradiction of the colonial state 
attempting to 'fix' the highly mobile Masuris onto the land and into settled agricultural lifestyles, 
                                                     
32 Major Malcolm Green to Lieutenant-Colonel HNR Green, 14 January 1864. 
33 See Tripodi, Edge of Empire, 53. 
34 Lambrick, John Jacob, 111. 
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while having very limited powers to compel obedience from them. The Greens’ argument for 
canal development in Upper Sindh aimed to regularise state control over people and space in the 
region at the same time as it demonstrated the fragile nature of state power on the frontier. 
Turning the frontier into colonial space, and consolidating control there, required the tribes’ 
voluntary cooperation. A later Commissioner-in-Sindh, Evan James, reiterated that canal 
development had given the administration an alternative to coercion in managing tribal 
behaviour. Of the three frontier canals that the British extended or constructed between the 1850s 
and the 1880s, James wrote, the Deputy Commissioner for the Upper Sindh frontier had 
distributed the lands himself. Here lands were granted gratis to Baloch Sirdars and tribes, ‘the 
object being to reclaim them from rapine and plunder and induce them to take to peaceful 
pursuits.’35 In fact many British land grants to subgroups of the Bugti tribe from the hills during 
the 1870s were intended to enhance the power of particular pastoral headmen who remained in 
Balochistan, rather than merely to encourage the Baloch to abandon pastoralism in favour of 
settlement.36 The main intended effect of grants of Sindhi land sometimes took place in 
Balochistan, not in Sindh itself. But the repeated assertion of Sindh officers that canal land near 
the Baloch border had value in removing the sting from raids into British territory suggested that 
this was an important concern, at least of the provincial administration. Indeed the 1907 
provincial Gazetteer demonstrated the longevity of James' vision of land distribution on these 
canals; it claimed that the Desert Canal in particular had ‘helped to wean the frontier tribes from 
inveterate habits of lawlessness’.37  This frontier, then, was a site for incorporating Baloch tribes 
                                                     
35 Evan James, Commissioner-in-Sindh, to Secretary to GoB RD, 08 October 1896. MSA, GoB RD vol. 147 of 1897, 
compilation 1486.  
36 Gilmartin, Blood and Water, ch. 2 [p.42-43 of manuscript]. 
37 Edward Hamilton Aitken, Gazetteer of the Province of Sind (Karachi: ‘Mercantile’ Steam Press for the 
Government [of Bombay?], 1907), 265-269. 
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into the colonial order by turning them from nomadic state-evaders into settled cultivators and 
peaceable subjects.  
Governance and settled agriculture therefore went hand in hand on the Upper Sindh 
frontier during the 1840s and 1850s. Canals were instrumental in this approach. Officials seemed 
to be concerned with the frontier primarily as a zone where the state struggled to act, especially 
in law and order terms. Officials believed settling tribesmen on canal land would make the 
frontier easier to govern. Their prime concern was not nature, space, and agriculture so much as 
the effect that transforming nature through canal colonisation would have. Indeed the district was 
a frontier by virtue of what lay just outside, and those who could not readily be prevented from 
coming inside: Baloch raiders. In this sense British thinking about the Upper Sindh frontier was 
necessarily oriented outwards, towards the other side of the border. Instrumentally, canals, 
sedentary agriculture, and intensified land-use were a means to the desired end of peace between 
Sindh and the tribes. Conceptually, they transformed an ungovernable wild space, empire’s 
‘outside’, into a more orderly inside.  
 
4. CANALS AND MODERNISATION ON AN INTERNAL FRONTIER  
Irrigation was also the key technology that officials used to address the problem of 
insufficient state control over internal frontiers – the ‘wild’ spaces of interior Sindh. Even well 
inside Sindh’s provincial boundaries, where there were no border-crossing tribes to challenge 
colonial authority, a scarce population and limited communications meant that the administration 
had little presence. Unlike the process of marking off colonial plains space from tribal hill space, 
which had characterised British policy in Upper Sindh, the administration’s approach to south-
eastern Sindh aimed to extend state power more evenly over the area irrigated by one particular 
canal, the Jamrao canal, during the 1890s-1900s. The Jamrao tract, beginning north-east of the 
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southern town Hyderabad and stretching towards the Thar Desert on Sindh’s eastern fringes, was 
mostly uncultivated scrubland. With little tax-yielding agriculture there, and no major canals, 
neither revenue officials nor engineers frequented the area. Canal technology, as on the external 
frontier of Upper Sindh, could help establish the state’s writ. But the narrow political remit of 
Upper Sindh canal construction gave way to a more ambitious assault on the perceived 
characteristics of south-eastern Sindh: arid, socially backward, and poor. Officials approached 
this objective in two ways: first, by introducing new irrigation technologies that facilitated and 
embedded official control over agriculture in a way that was unprecedented in Sindh; and 
second, by promoting the immigration of particular groups into the canal tract, in order to create 
a new social geography of agricultural productivity and loyalty to the colonial regime.  
The shift in British attention from the external frontier with Balochistan to internal 
frontiers like the Jamrao tract was the culmination of changes in colonial agricultural policy in 
Sindh, which two major developments made possible. First, the British officer Robert Sandeman 
instituted a new system of political relations with the tribes of Balochistan, which greatly 
reduced the threat of cross-border raiding into both Sindh and Punjab. As Deputy Commissioner 
of Dera Ghazi Khan District in Punjab between 1866 and 1876, Sandeman proactively 
intercepted Baloch raiding parties on British territory. From 1877, as Agent to the Governor 
General in Balochistan, he worked effectively to stabilise relations between the Khan of Kalat 
and his tribes. Following the decrease in raiding, civilian administrators replaced military 
officers as the administrators of the Upper Sindh Frontier District in 1881.38 Second, 
infrastructure development in Sindh continued apace. As the 1890s commenced, several 
important new irrigation schemes were in progress in northern, southern and eastern Sindh. 
                                                     
38 On Sandeman, see Tripodi, Edge of Empire, 57-61; Marsden and Hopkins, Fragments of the Afghan Frontier, ch.2. 
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Extensions to Sindh’s rail network during the 1880s and 1890s also helped to open up the 
province commercially.39 Both of these developments helped the government to improve its 
revenue base in the province, and move beyond simply maintaining its political position by 
finding collaborators and suppressing revolt. 
Under these changing conditions, the Sindh administration increasingly prioritised the 
commercialisation of agriculture within the province. Like provincial governments across India, 
it constructed canals for profit. In Sindh, unlike elsewhere in India, there was no special charge 
for water: cultivators paid for water that they received from government canals by paying higher 
tax rates on the crops they grew. Building or improving canals was an important way of pushing 
up revenue receipts, and reforms to the land revenue system accompanied canal-digging. 
Beginning in 1887, an ‘Irrigational Settlement’ was introduced piecemeal into Sindh, which 
determined land revenue according to the type of irrigation practised upon it.40 The Jamrao 
Canal, constructed between 1898 and 1900, was designed to make a profit, and once it came into 
operation the provincial administration was pleased to learn that the canal was projected to have 
raised enough money to cover its costs and begin making profits by the relatively early date of 
1931.41 Canal development in the province also had political and environmental implications. 
The Jamrao Canal was designed irrigate more than 900,000 acres of land, with engineers able to 
control water distribution much more closely than on any other part of Sindh’s irrigation 
network. Also unlike any other canal in Sindh at the time, it provided water to raise two crops 
                                                     
39 On railways, see Sarah Ansari, Life After Partition: Migration, community and strife in Sindh, 1947-1962 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2005), 24-25. 
40 The administration distinguished between ‘lift’ irrigation, which relied on raising water in buckets from a low-
lying watercourse to higher land, and ‘flow’ irrigation, in which water flowed down onto land beneath a channel. 
Aitken, Gazetteer, 406-407. 
41 ‘Statement of Financial Anticipations’, 17 March 1903, in Government of Bombay, Public Works Department, 
Report on the Jamrao Canal Project, Sind (Bombay: Government Central Press, 1907), 6. 
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per year on each patch of land, rather than only one, making land more valuable. It was the 
widest-ranging and most visible example of British attempts to strengthen the colonial state’s 
control over people and space, pushing back the internal frontier in the process. 
The Jamrao Canal demonstrated the degree to which British officials were re-envisioning 
Sindh as an arena for modernist development. The Jamrao project was the first large-scale, 
systematic attempt to construct a new, avowedly modern type of agrarian society in the 
province’s interior. Administrators were no longer concerned with using canal irrigation to 
demarcate empire’s inside from its outside. Instead, the process of constructing and colonizing 
the Jamrao Canal revealed an equal concern with imposing order on space. Settled agricultural 
regions represented zones of colonial control, while non-irrigated land represented a chaotic 
‘state of nature’. Disciplining the landscape, even in empire’s interiors, was therefore a first 
order of business. 
Physical conditions were certainly adverse, and official accounts of the Jamrao project 
emphasised the wildness of the places the canal occupied. The construction work was tough, and 
several engineers who were assigned to the project ‘broke down’ after a few months in the 
desolate, sweltering landscape.42 Both engineers and workmen suffered from cholera and 
malaria; one engineer wrote that ‘at first the country was a dismal desert where no provisions nor 
even drinking water at some places could be got’.43 In these respects, the Jamrao project was 
similar to the contemporary canal construction projects of western Punjab. The Punjab canal 
colonies were a platform for demonstrating the value of European science, technology, and 
                                                     
42  GoB Public Works Department (PWD) Resolution W.I.-1399, 10 June 1902, pr.1. MSA, GoB RD vol. 150 of 1902, 
compilation 1486.  
43 Executive Engineer, Jamrao Canal Southern District, to Superintending Engineer, Indus Left Bank Division, 09 
April 1902, quoted in PWD Resolution WI-1399, 10 June 1902. 
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human endeavour.44 Similarly, the Jamrao tract’s very wildness made it an ideal object of 
transformation. The new kind of agriculture that officials wished to introduce was premised on 
the notion of scientific water control. As Weil has argued, the second half of the nineteenth 
century marked the ascendancy in the Indus Basin (and elsewhere in India) of water control 
policy designed to address engineering, rather than political, considerations.45  
Increased technical control over water flows enabled greater disciplining of space. 
Specifically, the system of water control envisaged by the Jamrao Canal’s designers had 
implications for land usage. Irrigation provision on the Upper Sindh frontier had resulted from a 
desire to demarcate a zone of colonial control, morally coded as ‘good’ and controllable, in 
contrast with the ‘bad’ and uncontrollable tribal hill region beyond it. By contrast, the layout of 
watercourses and villages on the Jamrao tract was geared towards enabling greater state control 
over cultivation and thereby producing a modern landscape. Accordingly, the technique of 
planning and constructing agricultural spaces in south-eastern Sindh did not rely on mobilising 
Baloch labour to dig canals which they themselves then settled. Instead, the Jamrao project was 
an arena for careful top-down planning. 
Unlike most villages in Sindh, village boundaries along the Jamrao tract were demarcated 
before the canal was completed, and before settlement occurred.  The tract was, in principle, 
divided into a nested hierarchy of 2,000-acre villages, 16-acre squares, and one-acre sub-squares. 
The water-distribution system was equally rigid. Larger channels carried water from the main 
canal, with channels of successively decreasing size branching off to serve particular areas of 
                                                     
44 David Gilmartin, ‘Migration and Modernity: The state, the Punjabi village, and the settling of the canal colonies’, 
in Ian Talbot and Shinder Thandi (eds), People on the Move: Punjabi colonial and post-colonial migration (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2004), 3-5. 
45 Benjamin Weil, ‘The Rivers Come: Colonial flood control and knowledge systems in the Indus Basin, 1840s-
1930s’, Environment and History 12 (2006), 3-29. 
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land. Villages were supposedly limited to 2,000 acres in area, and watercourses to three miles in 
length, to optimize the efficiency with which water could be distributed.46 Mr Dunn, the 
Superintending Engineer in charge of the Jamrao Canal, celebrated the degree of control that the 
organisation of water management in the Jamrao tract gave to irrigation officials.47  
Reality in the tract did not quite live up to the plan. While officials intended technical 
principles to govern village layouts and the use of water, the logistics of maintaining close 
control often defeated the administration.  Village acreage and watercourse lengths frequently 
exceeded the stipulated limits, and cultivators were lax about building the barriers necessary to 
divide up the 16-acre squares. Some officials, too, expressed reservations about trying to assert 
too much control over the tract’s agricultural spaces. For example, both the Commissioner-in-
Sindh and the Bombay government’s Revenue Secretary were uncomfortable with suggestions 
that the administration should formally prohibit rice growing, which would use more water per 
field than the canal was designed to supply.48 Yet these villages and the accompanying water-
distribution system were far more ordered and regular than those found elsewhere in Sindh.  As 
Mitchell has argued of village reconstruction in nineteenth-century Egypt, colonial building 
projects aimed at order. They replaced crowded, haphazard native villages with new, pre-
planned, regular villages.49 In a similar vein, laying out villages on the Jamrao tract gave officials 
an opportunity to match a closely controlled canal with more intensive management of people 
                                                     
46 For details on village layout and water distribution on the Jamrao tract, see Government of Bombay, Public 
Works Department, Report on the Jamrao Canal Project, Sind (Bombay: Government Central Press, 1907), 3, 71-73. 
47 Note by Superintending Engineer Indus Left Bank Division, 17 July 1901. British Library, London (henceforth BL), 
RD (Lands) (July-December 1901), IOR/P/6239, p.2411. 
48 See Secretary to Government of Bombay, to Secretary to Government of India, Revenue and Agricultural 
Department, 26 September 1898. Government of Sindh Archives, Karachi (henceforth GSA), GoB RD 69A of 1899, 
vol. I. 
49  Timothy Mitchell, Colonising Egypt (Berkeley; Oxford: University of California Press, 1991), 44-45. 
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and agricultural space.  
The possibility of doing so depended on the relative ‘emptiness’ of the region. Colonial 
discourse in Punjab drew sharp distinctions between types of land. One type had a clear owner, 
and was actively farmed. Village commons, or ‘wasteland’, was another.50 In Sindh, where 
landowners frequently owned vast tracts but cultivated only small portions of it, the 
administration recognised a wider range of landowners’ proprietary claims to land which had 
long lain fallow than in Punjab.51 Yet where such claims did not exist, land was open to fresh 
colonisation and development. Population scarcity in the tract therefore became an opportunity 
rather than a concern, since it meant that there was plenty of land that the state could claim, and 
use to settle carefully-chosen immigrant cultivators. The very emptiness of the tract made it a 
suitably blank slate on which the administration could project a new kind of agrarian society. 
The Jamrao tract, then, changed from a wild space to a site of greater state control. The ‘dismal 
desert’ in Sindh was becoming the site of a more sophisticated architecture of governance, which 
encompassed both technical and social aspects of agricultural production.  
The thoroughness of control to which canal development in the Jamrao tract aspired 
distinguished south-eastern Sindh’s internal frontier from Upper Sindh’s external one. But one 
similarity was the logic of fixing people to particular locations. Indeed, turning nomadic hill 
people into settled plains cultivators had been the primary aim of Upper Sindh administrators 
from John Jacob to HNR Green. The difference was, again, the level of care that the 
administration showed in selecting land grantees whom they thought would both yield revenue 
and demonstrate loyalty to the regime. The remainder of this section of the article shows how 
                                                     
50 David Gilmartin, ‘Water and Waste: Nature, productivity and colonialism in the Indus Basin’,  
 Economic and Political Weekly 38:4 (November 29 – December 5, 2003): 5057-5065, pp.5061-5062. 
51 Evan James, Commissioner-in-Sindh, to Secretary to Government of Bombay, RD, 08 October 1896. MSA, RD vol. 
147 of 1897, compilation 1486. 
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Jamrao colonisation policy aimed to transform the internal frontier through a new social 
geography. 
Jamrao tract colonisation policy was complex and detailed, and this article cannot 
describe it in full.52 But officials were determined to fix agricultural communities to agrarian 
lifestyles near the canal. In this they drew on precedents from the settlement of canal colonies in 
western Punjab, which had begun in 1885.53 The first question in Jamrao colonisation was who 
ought to obtain land. In some senses, colonisation policy suggested that much of the Jamrao tract 
was not an exceptional space: the administration offered first refusal on the vast majority of new 
canal land, about 85 percent, to local landowners.54 This helped to preserve the administration’s 
relationship with its traditional collaborators in the region, something that routinely determined 
everyday relations between the colonial state and its more powerful subjects in Sindh and 
elsewhere.55 The bulk of land allocation therefore coincided with the government’s continued 
need for political stability.  
But what the administration did with the remainder demonstrated changing priorities. The 
conquest of this frontier required settlers who were willing to commit to making a given plot of 
land productive. Most notably the settlers of Upper Sindh canal land, Baloch tribes, were now 
out of favour.  Even before the Jamrao project began, Sindh’s overlord government in Bombay 
had been pressing the provincial administration to replace ad hoc land distribution with a clear 
                                                     
52 For a detailed discussion, see Timothy Daniel Haines, ‘Building the Empire, Building the Nation: Water, land, and 
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55 See Sarah FD Ansari, Sufi Saints and State Power: The pirs of Sindh, 1843-1947 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
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and systematic policy. Lord Sandhurst, the Governor of Bombay, recognised the importance of 
‘reclaiming from predatory habits the wilder tribes by grants of land’, but insisted on public 
auction as the chief mechanism for allocation.56 Baloch tribes, then, were no longer the main 
object of canal development. The requirements of British policy on the internal frontier in south-
eastern Sindh, geared towards assimilating the Jamrao tract into a settled, closely administered 
agricultural order, contrasted sharply with the Upper Sindh concern with fixing tribesmen to 
particular places. In June 1898, for instance, Commissioner-in-Sindh James made clear that the 
administration would not use Jamrao land to reward service on the external frontier, even though 
political officers in Balochistan supported tribal leaders’ applications for land.57 Balochis were 
‘not good cultivators’, he wrote, and the administration instead wanted ‘good strong capable 
cultivators’ from Punjab.58 
With Baloch tribes no longer expected to pose a law-and-order threat to Sindh, the need 
to fix them to land in British India had disappeared. Instead the administration imported Punjabi 
peasants. Punjabi peasants were favoured figures in official imaginations, typically considered to 
be loyal, hard-working, and effective commercial farmers.59 The financial success of the Punjab 
canal colonies rendered Punjabi peasants even more desirable to a Sindh administration 
determined to increase revenue receipts. Officials organised Punjabi settlement in the Jamrao 
tract according to their religion and place of origin. Whole villages were assigned to 
communities of cultivators hailing from specific districts in Punjab. By July 1901, two villages 
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had been settled by Amritsar Sikhs and one by Jalandhar Sikhs; nine villages were of Punjabi 
Muslims.60 Separating communities of cultivators by location meant creating pockets of land and 
society that colonial officials expected to be agriculturally productive while giving the 
administration little trouble. Officials involved in later canal colonisation schemes in Sindh, 
during the 1920s and 1930s, regarded the settlement of Punjabi peasants in the Jamrao tract as an 
economic and political success.61 Using Punjabi outsiders to promote colonial authority in the 
Jamrao tract attested to the continued importance of encouraging demographic change in Sindh’s 
frontier policy.  
Another aspect of Jamrao colonisation policy attempted to physically the social 
geography of apathy and resistance among some Sindhis. The transformed landscape of the 
Jamrao tract served as an arena for the integration of ‘troublesome’ groups into orderly 
communities, physically displaced from the regions where they had previously resisted the 
state’s rule. Policy towards the internal frontier, like the earlier policy towards the external 
frontier, attempted to fix mobile state-resisters to a socially and spatially defined agrarian order. 
One example was the resettlement of the Hurs, a group of outlaws who proclaimed devotion to 
the Pir Pagaro, an influential hereditary saint. The Hurs had rebelled against British authority in 
south-eastern Sindh between 1894 and 1896.62 Apart from relocating them from their ancestral 
villages to the Jamrao tract, the Commissioner-in-Sindh proposed mixing the Hurs with loyalist 
military pensioners of Baloch, Pashto, and Punjabi extraction.63  
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Another group, the Talpur Mirs, presented a different issue. As the descendants of the 
Talpurs who had ruled Sindh before Napier’s conquest, the Mirs at the end of the nineteenth 
century received privileges and government pensions. They had been key British allies after the 
conquest, but by the 1890s the administration had found a broad enough base of collaborators 
that it did not need to maintain the special position of what Commissioner James called ‘this 
troublesome and at present useless and discontented class’.64 Other officers took a friendlier view 
of the Mirs, but still favoured using Jamrao land to encourage them to abandon their memories of 
glory and settle into farming.65 While the administration did not ultimately compel the Mirs to 
disperse into the general populace and supervise day-to-day agricultural activities, it did manage 
to settle many of them in the tract.66 By exercising its power to shuffle populations around 
imperial territory, the administration increased its control over people as well as over the ‘wild’ 
spaces under its jurisdiction.  
The Jamrao Canal both marked the changing nature of Sindh, and contributed to the 
process of change. The land colonisation policy suggested that the colonial administration felt 
more secure in relation to threats originating just across the border in eastern Balochistan. 
Political stability within the tract itself and across Sindh, and not in the trans-border region to the 
north and west of the province, was the priority. For this reason, local landowners absorbed the 
bulk of the land. Plans to import Punjabi cultivators, as well as the control that the Public Works 
Department and Revenue Department attempted to maintain over irrigation and cultivation, 
spoke to a conception of Sindh as a region where the state could encourage farming and extract 
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revenue, rather than hope merely to suppress revolt. The ideology of productivity also fitted into 
the Jamrao scheme’s assault on the province’s dry south-east. Making the desert bloom, a 
repeated trope in later British and Pakistani rhetoric about irrigated agriculture in Sindh, had 
roots in the Jamrao project’s transformation of the tract.67 Both construction and colonization 
afforded the administration an opportunity to extend and intensify its control over people and the 
environment, so far as political expediency allowed. In this way, the Jamrao Canal pushed the 
government’s authority into areas where the state had penetrated only poorly in the past. The 
internal frontier had replaced the external frontier as the main object of development, but that 
development was different. The Jamrao tract was closer than Upper Sindh to the railway 
networks and trade routes that made commercial agriculture possible. As an internal frontier, 
located well inside the empire’s borders, the administration could also address the tract’s 
environmental challenges to state authority without worrying about the destabilising effects of 
violent incursions from outside. Opening up this internal frontier meant applying technological 
and social fixes to the landscape in order to boost agricultural production and consolidate 
imperial authority. 
5. CONCLUSION 
The passage of time, and events outside the province, lessened the relevance of the Upper 
Sindh frontier as the practical stopping-point of British power. Although Sindh’s location on the 
route to Afghanistan had helped lead to its annexation in 1843, British officers subsequently 
seemed, day to day, more preoccupied with the province’s internal and external frontiers than 
with Great Game strategy. With the virtual pacification of Balochistan under Sandeman, Sindh’s 
border trouble was much reduced. At the same time, the administration in Sindh pushed towards 
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more regular and formalised control over space in the province as a whole. Political and 
infrastructural developments inside and outside the province had brought a more centralised style 
of governance and more systematic canal management. But the politics of external frontiers did 
not die out. Western Balochistan, and the Pashtun-dominated North-West Frontier, became the 
places where imperial power met exceptional circumstances.68 Lord Curzon’s trek across the 
Pamirs in 1894 demonstrated the continuing importance of British relationships with borderland 
tribes.69 But Sindh frontier politics turned inwards, towards the spaces where colonial authority 
was hampered by a harsh environment and a lack of settled agriculturalists. Like the Upper Sindh 
frontier, the Jamrao tract constituted a particular area that demanded novel ways for the state to 
interact with, and assert control over, the population. Canal irrigation again appeared as an 
activity that engaged people with the land in particular ways, and made them easier to govern. 
This was certainly true of both the frontiers that this article has discussed, where canal-building 
was consistently expected to transform the local environment.  
Comparing British policy on the internal and external frontiers reveals that colonial 
applications of irrigation technology and land tenure in each case was intended to produce 
significantly different geographies of state space. Whereas canal policy on the mid-nineteenth 
century Upper Sindh frontier aimed at securing the border, the Jamrao Canal turned the internal 
frontier into a space of opportunity to be exploited. Official discourse represented the external 
frontier as an interface between the cultivated plains, the domain of the colonial state, and the 
hills beyond it which they considered wild. Digging canals in Upper Sindh and encouraging 
Baloch tribes to settle them distracted potential raiders from committing violent acts against 
colonial subjects, and brought the limits of effective state control nearer to Sindh’s provincial 
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boundaries. At the same time, it physically removed Baloch tribesmen from their upland 
environment and incorporated them into an agrarian social order. Canal digging in Upper Sindh 
was meant to act on tribal people as much as on the plains landscape. Drawing the tribes into 
Sindh and settling them on canal land meant bringing them into colonial space. This helped to 
demarcate Upper Sindh as a part of empire’s inside, in contrast with the hills that constituted its 
outside.  
The idea of establishing a space in which Indian cultivators would act on their 
environment to make it agriculturally productive, which in turn would make the cultivators loyal 
state subjects, also underpinned colonial policy on the internal frontier in south-eastern Sindh. 
Here, however, the project was not intended to demarcate inner and outer spaces. Instead it 
sought to consolidate colonial control in the province by bringing more land under intensive 
revenue-producing agriculture. But the Jamrao project had equally important spatial and 
ideological implications. Beinart and Hughes have argued that the notion of a frontier suggests 
restless expansion; but, they continue, frontier policies across the British Empire tended to 
stabilise imperial spatiality.70 Similarly, fully assimilating the Jamrao tract into a settled, 
administered agricultural order helped to produce a social geography of loyalty to the state. As 
Robbins has shown of later attempts in Rajasthan to divide ‘social’ from ‘natural’ spaces and 
enforce different kinds of land use in them, state control is the key to the production of ‘modern’ 
landscapes.71 Relying as it did on turning agricultural surpluses into revenue, rather than industry 
or commerce, the colonial state in India was rooted in plains agriculture. Irrigation extension via 
the Jamrao canal transformed a near-desert into the realm of state-sponsored modernity.  
                                                     
70 Beinart and Hughes, Environment and Empire, 2. 
71 Paul Robbins, ‘Tracking Invasive Land Covers in India, or Why Our Landscapes Have Never Been Modern’, Annals 
of the Association of American Geographers 91, no. 4 (2001): 637-659. 
 32 
 
Where does this leave our understanding of frontiers more generally? This article has 
argued for continued investigation into the environmental basis of frontiers. However flawed the 
theory and practice, the idea of simultaneously remaking people and nature as a transformative 
process recalls Frederick Jackson Turner's near-contemporary thesis on the frontier of the 
American West. By comparing settler processes in the United States and South Africa, Beinart 
and Coates have highlighted the broad applicability of an environmental framework for 
understanding frontiers in different contexts. Bello and Perdue have shown that malarial 
mosquitoes and classical Chinese ideas about savagery and the natural environment helped 
regulate relations between the Qing state and its borderlands.72 Redclift has identified places in 
South America where the natural environment is transformed or plundered to meet human needs 
as commodity and settlement frontiers.73 This article has demonstrated that the attention that 
these and other authors draw to transformations of nature is applicable, to a point, to imperial 
India. 
But we have also seen that the British Indian state’s engagement with two types of 
frontier in Sindh produced distinctive forms of frontier policy. This change occurred even within 
the relatively short time span of half a century, and in two cases of canal-digging in parts of the 
same province. Accordingly we must be cautious in our theoretical understanding of frontiers, 
and pay close attention to the specifics of local contexts as well as the many similarities between 
frontiers in a range of times and places. As Heesterman recognised, his own claim that the true 
frontiers of Mughal power were internal and not external does not translate readily to the British 
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imperial period. The internal frontier was indeed an object of development in Sindh. But it took 
particular historical circumstances, and the state’s increased technical and logistical ability, to 
turn officials’ attention inwards from the external frontier. The example of the relationship 
between colonial officials and Baloch raiders in Upper Sindh partially supports Clark’s recent 
assertion that a frontier is essentially ‘a cultural division, a loosely defined zone that 
differentiates two distinct cultures that commonly view each other in terms of civilization’.74 But 
if we understand frontiers more broadly as zones where difficult terrain and environmental 
conditions severely limit state control, as on the internal frontier of south-eastern Sindh, then the 
inside/outside binary does not apply. In the Jamrao Canal case, the relevant binary was 
wasteland/productive land. Lacking a distinction ‘in terms of civilization’ did not reduce the 
sense among colonial officials that transforming the internal frontier would produce a state space 
with the attributes of a truly civilised life: peaceable agriculture and permanent residence. This 
tracks much more closely to what Scott described as the civilization/barbarism binary in the 
worldviews of rice-growing valley states in Southeast Asia, which divided state and non-state 
space. But the sharp break in the intensity of development on the Jamrao tract, compared with 
canal-digging in Upper Sindh, demonstrates the variegated nature of state space itself. For all 
that frontier discourses, including those of the British in Sindh, have relied on binary distinctions 
between the civilised and the wild, frontiers are varied places. In Ludden’s elegant 
generalisation, ‘[f]rontiers are places and time where empire strives to incorporate people into 
orderly peripheries’.75 But a frontier’s orientation – inwards or outwards – goes a long way 
towards determining what an orderly periphery actually looks like. 
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